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Abstract 
In the mid-nineties, the New York City Schools Chancellor created a citywide 
improvement zone to take over a significant proportion of the city’s lowest 
performing schools whose local community school districts had failed to improve 
them. This “Chancellor’s District” defined centralized management, rather than 
local control, as the critical variable necessary to initiate, enforce and ensure the 
implementation of school improvement. This large-scale intervention involved 
both a governance change and a set of capacity-building interventions presumably 
unavailable under local sub-district control. Our study retrospectively examined the 
origins, structure and components of the Chancellor’s District, and analyzed the 
characteristics and outcomes of the elementary schools mandated to receive these 
interventions. Our longitudinal analysis compared Chancellor’s District schools to 
New York City’s other state-identified low performing schools, based on a school-
level panel of performance, demographic, human resource, and expenditure data 
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collected from district Annual School Report Cards and School Based Expenditure 
Reports from 1998–99 through 2001–02. The results suggest that the Chancellor’s 
District intervention improved these schools’ instructional capacity and academic 
outcomes, both relative to where these schools would have been and relative to 
comparable schools. 
Keywords: school reform; low performing schools; accountability; district 
intervention 
Introduction 
This article analyzes the results of the Chancellor’s District, an initiative created to accelerate 
their improvement by remove state-identified low-performing schools from their local district 
authorities, imposing a uniform curriculum, intensive professional development, reduced class size, 
extended time and other reforms. The seven-year Chancellor’s District initiative represents both an 
unprecedented intervention into New York City school governance and a major challenge to several 
reigning theories about the relationship between centralized administration and local school change. 
Consider, first, how the Chancellor’s District departed from the New York City school system’s 
governance norms.  
From 1969 to 2003, New York City’s public elementary and middle schools were governed by 
32 decentralized community school districts (hereafter sub-districts), administered by locally elected 
school boards and their appointees, the community superintendents. These sub-districts were quite 
large, averaging more than 20,000 students, with several of the largest districts enrolling more than 
40,000 students. Many of these sub-districts would have ranked among the 50 largest school systems 
in the country had they been independent jurisdictions.  
During their thirty-four years of relative autonomy, these sub-districts developed diverse, 
and differentially effective, patterns of operation. Consistently high performance characterized 
schools in some sub-districts, while poor management and dismal student outcomes plagued schools 
in others. Though the grim correlations among race, poverty and student achievement that 
characterize most urban districts have also persisted in New York City, individual school outcomes 
varied widely, both across and within the community school sub-districts. Academic performance 
was especially poor, and particularly highly correlated with indicators of race and poverty, in those 
sub-districts whose governance was marked by patterns of corruption, patronage and, most 
importantly, a consistent failure to focus on improving teaching and learning. 
The school system’s central administration, governed by an appointed citywide board of 
education and a chief administrative officer (the Chancellor), had possessed the authority to remove 
failing schools from their community school sub-districts since the city system was decentralized in 
1969. But that power remained unexercised for almost three decades until 1996, when the reigning 
Chancellor created a new, geographically non-contiguous sub-district, and imposed the same 
improvement regimen on each school. The Chancellor’s District became a new, non-geographic 
improvement zone that eventually removed some 58 elementary and middle schools from local sub-
district control. 
This effort to remove failing schools from their sub-district jurisdictions in order to improve 
them was a radical change in New York City school governance. From the onset of decentralization, 
central leadership had bemoaned sub-district failure but had refused to intervene, either to force sub-
districts to take steps to improve their schools or to take failing schools away from local sub-district 
control. The Chancellor’s assertion of the power to take over failing schools, and his creation of a new 
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district to force-feed their improvement represents an historic departure from three decades of 
unobstructed local sub-district control. 
This article describes the origins, structure, and components of the Chancellor’s District, and 
details our analysis of whether these particularly low performing schools were improved more than 
other state-identified low performing schools. To understand the nature of the intervention that the 
Chancellor’s District represented, we analyzed administrative documents, including budget allocation 
memoranda, and conducted numerous interviews with state and city administrators. To evaluate the 
impact of the Chancellor’s District as an intervention, we conducted a longitudinal analysis that 
compared the academic performance of Chancellor’s District schools to New York City’s other state 
identified, low performing (SURR) schools. The next section situates the Chancellor’s District 
initiative in reform theory and reform efforts, and the following section details the results of 
interviews with district officials about how this special district worked as an intervention. The 
subsequent sections detail the quantitative data and methods used for this study, including its 
limitations, and changes in the Chancellor’s District schools and their implications about the 
district’s overall effectiveness. 
The Chancellor’s District initiative ended in July 2003, with the implementation of a system-
wide restructuring policy that reorganized the entire New York City school system. The 32 
elementary and middle schools in the Chancellor’s District were transferred back to their local sub-
districts, which were themselves subsumed into a new regional structure under the Chancellor’s 
direct control. Thus the Chancellor’s District initiative is now history, and each of the new 
administrative regions is now responsible for improving its failing schools. But the extent to which 
the Chancellor’s District initiative succeeded in improving student outcomes, particularly in the 
failing elementary schools whose outcomes we examined, directly challenges the reigning theories 
that link school improvement to decentralization, and has important implications for the variety of 
school- and district-level improvement efforts underway in urban districts across the country. 
Big Bureaucracy, District Capacity and School Improvement 
The Chancellor’s District initiative is unique among recent large-scale reform efforts. Given 
the scale and complexity of the New York City system, the Chancellor’s District initiative is akin to 
state takeover efforts of poorly performing districts. Because the Chancellor is responsible for more 
schools (currently over 1,300) than many state chiefs, the Chancellor’s administrative relationship to 
the 32 sub-districts was comparable to state commissioners’ relationships to their local school 
districts. Moreover, as most states’ takeover efforts of local districts have been for financial 
mismanagement rather than instructional failure, few state takeovers have targeted as many schools 
for restructuring, redesign and instructional improvement as the Chancellor’s District effort. 
The Chancellor’s District initiative also poses a strong challenge to three important 
arguments in the research about the relationship between district administration and school change. 
Historically, many researchers and critics have inveighed against the effects of district size and the 
resulting bureaucracies, contending that large urban systems have become ungovernable and 
impervious to reform efforts (Domanico, 1994). Seymour Sarason’s (1996) classic analysis 
maintained that big-city schools are “insulated,” “encapsulated,” and in other ways immune from 
hierarchically imposed efforts to alter dysfunctional practice at the school level. In another classic 
study, Weick (1976) argued that the “loose coupling” within the various layers of complex urban 
systems stymies the efforts of centralized interventions to produce changes in school practices that 
might lead to school improvement.  
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This analysis of the inevitable barriers to change that scale and hierarchical complexity 
impose may not necessarily imply reform from below or one-school-at-a-time change. But the 
critique’s prognosis of the likely effectiveness of centralized administrative efforts to drive change is 
quite bleak. The Chancellor’s District’s forced-march efforts to improve the schools taken from 
their local sub-districts challenge this critical tradition.  
Second, the Chancellor’s District initiative challenges several influential currents of recent 
reform theory that link the necessity for decentralization with the need to provide maximum 
autonomy at the school level to achieve successful schools. In Politics, Markets and America’s 
Schools, John Chubb and Terry Moe (1990) argued that the key characteristic that distinguishes 
academically effective private schools from less effective public schools is the extent of autonomy at 
the school level. Chubb and Moe’s influential arguments stressed the inevitability of bureaucratization 
and consequent poor school performance unless schools are severed from district control and 
governed by market principles.  
Recent theoretical efforts to establish the primacy of the school, rather than the district, as 
the locus of improvement have not been monopolized by conservative scholars or market 
advocates. The Cross City Campaign for Urban School Reform, an advocacy organization composed 
of city reform groups, education advocates and parent activists, published an influential report 
(Hallet, 1995) that urged radical decentralization, to the school level, of all essential instructional and 
administrative functions, leaving school districts with only vestigial governing roles. The authors of 
Reinventing Central Office argued that urban school districts had consistently failed to implement 
effective improvement efforts, and characterized their administrations as retarding forces that stifled 
school-based reform efforts.  
A third recent and influential reform stream stresses the necessity for bottom-up or school-
by-school reform efforts. Several national reform consortia, such as the Coalition of Essential 
Schools, the School Development Program, the Accelerated Schools project and the New American 
Schools, all focus on the need to generate individual school improvement through the 
implementation of replicable programs. This reform stream was elevated into national prominence 
through federal legislation, the Comprehensive School Reform Demonstration program, popularly 
known as the Obey–Porter Act of 1997, which has allocated more than $300 million annually for 
grants to individual schools to implement supposedly research-validated improvement models. The 
role of the district in initiating, coordinating, or supporting these school-based efforts was, at best, 
subordinated to the role of the intermediary organizations marketing the particular models or, at 
worst, essentially untheorized (Bodilly, 2001). 
These reform currents that target individual schools as key improvement sites have begun to 
be challenged by efforts to define the school district as the necessary locus of capacity-building 
initiatives. Ascher, Fruchter, and Ikeda (1999), for example, argued that the local district “is the 
critical actor that can encourage or retard the school’s development of the necessary capacity for 
self-improvement” (Ascher, Fruchter, & Ikeda, 1999, p. 43). The Council of Great City Schools’ 
Foundations for Success (2002) analyzed the efforts of three urban districts to improve student 
academic performance, and to narrow the achievement gap between white students and students of 
color. The Annenberg Institute for School Reform has created School Communities that Work: A 
National Task Force on the Future of Urban Districts, to help districts restructure themselves into 
effective support systems focused on improving instruction. The University of Pittsburgh’s Learning 
Research and Development Center has created the Institute for Learning to help urban districts 
reorganize and improve their capacities to help their schools, and themselves, become continuous 
learning organizations (Snipes, Doolittle, & Herlihy, 2002). 
But in 1996, the Chancellor was bucking several traditions of reform theory when he took 
over schools whose local sub-districts had failed to improve them. His theory of action defined 
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centralized management, rather than decentralized local control, as the critical variable necessary to 
initiate, enforce and ensure the implementation of school improvement. Defining the core issues as 
the ability to mobilize the political will and instructional capacity necessary to improve schools, he 
asserted that the central administration could mandate the policies, implement the procedures and 
provide the resources necessary to transform failing schools. Given this premise, the Chancellor’s 
District involved both a governance change and a coherent set of capacity-building interventions 
presumably unavailable to low-performing schools under local sub-district control. 
The Design of the Chancellor’s District 
Since 1989, the New York State Education Department (SED) has used the Schools Under 
Registration Review (SURR) process to identify low-performing schools, and place them on a list of 
schools under registration review. SED requires SURR schools to create a comprehensive education 
plan, and can order chronically low-performing schools to undergo school redesign. Schools that fail 
to improve may have their registration revoked, which means they are effectively closed—the 
ultimate sanction of the SURR process. 
In October 1995, the New York State Education Commissioner informed New York City’s 
Schools Chancellor that he would revoke the registrations of sixteen chronically low-performing 
New York City schools that had long languished on the SURR list if their student performance did 
not improve by June 1997. In response, the Chancellor met with the schools’ local sub-district 
superintendents, community school board members, principals, and parent leaders, and notified 
them that he was requiring the schools to develop and implement instructional improvement plans. 
In half the schools, he removed the principals and mandated comprehensive school redesign.  
Unsatisfied with the sub-district and school responses to his actions, the Chancellor decided, 
in February 1996, to intervene directly in schools in which, in his determination, the local sub-
districts had “fail[ed] to demonstrate the capacity to redesign failing organizations” (New York City 
Board of Education, 1999b, p. 1). On his recommendation, the New York City Board of Education 
created the Chancellor’s District, with the mission “to develop and expand central, district, and local 
school capacity to transform failing school organizations into redesigned and revitalized schools that 
meet high educational standards for students” (New York City Board of Education, n.d., p. vi). He 
immediately transferred ten schools into the new sub-district. 
In the seven years of its operation, the Chancellor’s District included 58 elementary and 
middle schools.2 These schools entered the District in annual cohorts of various sizes. By the end of 
the 2002–03 school year, the District had closed eleven schools and returned fifteen to their home 
sub-districts. The Chancellor’s District has taken over schools from every New York City borough 
except Staten Island, with a disproportionate number from the Bronx. There were 32 elementary 
and middle schools in the District at the time of its dissolution in June 2003. 
The 1999–00 school year was a seminal year for the Chancellor’s District. Between 1996 and 
1999, the district had taken in only a small number of schools. But in 1999, after an extensive review 
of the patterns of failure across the city’s low-performing SURR schools, the Chancellor decided to 
take 37 more of the city’s lowest performing schools into the Chancellor’s District, and imposed a 
new, highly structured improvement plan, A Model of Excellence, on all the District’s schools. He 
also increased staff capacity in all the SURR schools, especially those in the Chancellor’s District. 
                                                 
2  Throughout its existence, the Chancellor’s District also included ten high schools, which had 
already been under more centralized control. These schools are not included in the analysis here. 
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His goal was to remove every New York City school from the SURR list within two years (New 
York City Board of Education, 1999b). 
 
Table 1 
Schools in the New York City Chancellor's District (CD), 1996–2003 
 
Academic 
Year Entered the CD 
Returned to  
Home District Closed 
1996–97 9 0 0 
1997–98 3 0 0 
1998–99 0 2 0 
1999–00 37 0 2 
2000–01 1 8 5 
2001–02 5 5 3 
2002–03 3 — 1 
Total 58 15 11 
Sources: New York State Education Department; New York City Board of Education 
  
City officials divided the city’s SURR schools into three groups. Category 1 schools were 
those assessed at highest risk of continued failure. Category 2 schools were at the next highest risk 
of failure. Category 3 schools were schools that were improving enough to become candidates for 
removal from the SURR list in the following year. Ten of the elementary and middle schools were 
identified as Category 1 schools had already been placed in the Chancellor’s District in previous 
years. Thirty-seven more Category 1 schools were added to the Chancellor’s District for the 1999–00 
school year. Though the remaining five Category 1 schools exhibited the same pattern of failure as 
the schools in the Chancellor’s District, they were allowed to remain in their local districts because 
their districts engaged in other major reform initiatives and the Chancellor decided that their sub-
districts had the capacity to support their schools’ improvement plans. The superintendents of these 
districts met monthly with the Chancellor’s District Supervising Superintendent to coordinate 
implementation of the intervention. 
Thus, in 1999–00, the Chancellor’s District consisted of 47 of the city’s SURR schools 
deemed to be the lowest performing elementary and middle schools. The district was sub-divided 
into four regions, each with its own instructional superintendent. In that same year, Chancellor’s 
District schools began implementing the new Model of Excellence. Class size was reduced 
throughout the district. A maximum of 20 students were mandated for kindergarten through grade 
3, and 25 students for grades 4 through 8.  
Instructional time was increased by extending both the school day and the school year. The 
school day was lengthened to 20 minutes longer than in other elementary and middle schools in 
New York City. The school calendar was also extended by one week. Instructional time was further 
enhanced by developing after-school programs, implemented in each Chancellor’s District school 
through a schedule of activities that extended the school day to 6 pm. The after-school program was 
designed to “enhance and enrich daily learning” (New York City Board of Education, 2001a, p. 2). 
Tutoring was offered from 3 to 4 pm in small group settings for those students in grades 3–5 who 
required extra reading or math assistance. 
A prescribed instructional program, a mandated daily schedule and a required curriculum 
were imposed throughout the district. In elementary schools, the schedule mandated two daily 90-
minute literacy blocks, the first using Success for All, and the second using the Balanced Literacy 
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program. The daily schedule also included a 60-minute math block, using the Trailblazers math 
program; and a 30-minute skills block, alternating between math and literacy skills. Science and 
social studies were each taught once per week. Because the time devoted to literacy instruction in the 
elementary school schedule was almost three times that assigned to math, the Chancellor’s District 
was perceived as concentrating on literacy skills improvement at the elementary level much more 
intensively than on math. 
The district also provided intensive professional development. Each school was assigned at 
least four on-site staff developers focused on English Language Arts, mathematics, technology and 
Success for All. Extra time was provided for professional development designed to be intensive, 
systematic, structured and aligned with the curriculum. Each school was provided with an on-site 
teacher center staffed by a teacher specialist who offered additional coaching and professional 
development. Assessments, integrated into the Success for All and Trailblazers programs, were 
designed to provide regular feedback to classroom teachers. In kindergarten through grade 3, the 
schools used New York City’s Early Childhood Literacy Assessment System (ECLAS) to assess and 
improve literacy growth. Specially developed benchmark assessments in reading and mathematics 
were used to assess the performance of students from grades 3 on. 
 
Table 2 
Model of Excellence Components, NYC Low-Performing Schools 
 
Component 
Chancellor's District 
schools (N=49) 
Other SURR schools 
(N=53) 
Reduced class size 3  
Extended school day and year 3  
After-school program 3 3 
Mandated instructional program 3 3 
Mandated daily schedule 3  
Mandated curriculum 3  
Number of on site staff developers 4 2 
Extra time for staff development  3  
Prescribed staff development 3  
Teacher center and teacher specialist 3 3 
Student assessment program 3 3 
Additional supervisory/district support 3  
 
Category 2 and 3 schools (“other SURR schools”) received fewer intervention components 
than schools in the Chancellor’s District, as illustrated in Table 2. Central authorities allocated 
additional funds, initially $20,000,000 (New York City Board of Education, 1999a), targeted to 
implement the specific interventions prescribed in the Model of Excellence in the Chancellor’s 
District schools. By 2000–01, when the Chancellor’s District model was fully implemented, the 
District’s schools spent an average of $2,400 more per student than the other SURR schools.3 
Most of the increased spending represented increased teacher costs, including two programs 
designed to attract certified teachers to the Chancellor’s District schools. Certified teachers who 
                                                 
3 According to the New York City Board of Education School Based Expenditure Reports, 
Chancellor’s District elementary and middle schools in 2000-01 spent an average of $13,150 per student. 
Other SURR schools spent an average of $10,744. This compares to an overall average New York City per 
student expenditure of $9,679 for elementary and middle schools. 
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chose to work in Extended Time Schools (ETS) received 15% additional pay in exchange for 
additional work. The ETS program, developed in collaboration with the United Federation of 
Teachers, was implemented in 1999–00 in all but two Chancellor’s District schools. Certified, 
experienced private school teachers who chose to teach in the Chancellor’s District received $10,000 
bonuses (Iatarola, 2001).  
The Chancellor’s District also introduced several policies to improve the qualifications, 
quality, preparation, and stability of the leadership and staff in Chancellor’s District schools. Most of 
the Chancellor’s District schools were assigned new principals. Additional assistant principals were 
also assigned, and both principals and assistant principals received professional development 
focused on how to supervise implementation of the instructional plan. 
The District, through its four instructional regions, provided additional intensive 
instructional and supervisory support to the schools’ leadership and staff. On-site professional 
development specialists, including three full-time instructional specialists (one each in literacy, 
mathematics and technology), a Success for All facilitator, and a teacher center specialist, provided 
consistent, intensive, highly structured professional development for all teachers in the district’s 
elementary schools. Teachers attended a one-week professional development program every August, 
in addition to the training they received on citywide staff development days.  
Furthermore, many ineffective teachers were removed from the Chancellor’s District 
schools. According to one official, the Chancellor’s District absorbed the cost of approximately two 
dozen teachers’ salaries until their cases were adjudicated, rather than allow them to remain in the 
classroom.  
Finally, the Chancellor introduced two important teacher incentive initiatives for all SURR 
schools, including those in the Chancellor’s District. The immediate impetus was the state mandate 
that as of September 1, 2000, only certified teachers would be assigned to SURR schools. In 
exchange for agreeing to work in SURR or other hard-to-staff schools for a full year, teachers 
received grants of up to $3,400 from the Teachers for Tomorrow program, which they could use to 
repay educational loans or meet other qualified educational expenses.  
Beginning in the 1999–00 school year, candidates for teacher positions who lacked 
traditional certification could participate in a new alternative certification program called the New 
York City Teaching Fellows Program. This program met the cost of a master’s degree in education 
and provided training during the summer, as well as mentors during the school year. New York State 
gave New York City Teaching Fellows provisional certification to allow them to teach while 
completing their degrees. Most Teaching Fellows were placed in the Chancellor’s District or other 
SURR schools. 
SURR schools often had a disproportionate number of full-time special education students, 
the result of previous sub-district placement decisions. City policy for all SURR schools, including 
Chancellor’s District Schools, was to examine the number of special education students and reduce 
disproportionate placements. 
As these program descriptions indicate, the Chancellor’s District mounted a comprehensive 
effort to improve the poorly performing schools that had been removed from their sub-district 
jurisdiction. The next section describes how we assessed the effectiveness of the Chancellor’s 
District’s efforts to improve these schools.  
Methods 
In addition to our analysis of New York City Board of Education budgets and interview data 
described above, we conducted a longitudinal analysis that compared the academic performance of 
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Chancellor’s District elementary schools to New York City’s other state identified, low performing 
(SURR) schools. We constructed a school-level panel, based on data collected from Annual School 
Report Cards and School Based Expenditure Reports from 1998–99 through 2001–02. These two 
administrative databases offer a wealth of information on student demographics, teacher credentials 
and experience, school organizational characteristics, and expenditures for all schools in the New 
York City school system. 
Our chief outcome variable was schools’ fourth-grade academic performance, expressed as 
average scale scores, the percent of students meeting the standard (Levels 3 and 4), and the percent 
far below the standard (Level 1) on the state’s English Language Arts (hereafter reading) and 
Mathematics exams. During the years observed, fourth grade test results were the primary criteria 
that the State Education Department used to determine elementary schools’ accountability status. 
We also examined differences in student, school, and teacher characteristics, as well as general 
education expenditures for Chancellor’s District schools, other SURR schools, and the citywide 
average, across all four years. Tables reporting changes over time on these variables are presented in 
the section below. Tables reporting cross-sectional means, standard deviations, and ranges for each 
variable analyzed are available from the authors. 
Study Sample 
As we indicate above, the Chancellor’s District as an intervention evolved over time, 
culminating in the implementation of the Model of Excellence in the 1999–00 school year. This 
evolution in design, and the extent of the changes in the Chancellor’s District as an intervention 
across time, posed analytical challenges for our evaluation. Not only were different schools in—or 
out—of the Chancellor’s District at different times, but the instructional regimen imposed on those 
schools also varied across time.  
Our solution was to focus our analysis on the elementary schools that were state identified as 
low performing (SURR) in 1998–99 and entered the Chancellor’s District in 1999–00 and thus 
received the full intervention described in the previous section. We use their 1998–99 data as a 
baseline. As a comparison group, we use the other elementary schools on the SURR list in 1998–99. 
Because the number of middle schools that were on the SURR list in 1998–99 was too small to 
support an appropriate statistical analysis, our study focuses on elementary schools only. For the 
purpose of this analysis, elementary schools are all schools that included a fourth grade, regardless of 
their overall grade configuration.4 Category 1 schools outside the Chancellor’s District, described 
above, were not included in the analysis. 
 
Table 3 
Sample Schools By Status, 1998–2002 
 
School Status  1998–99 1999–00 2000–01 2001–02 
Chancellor's District schools     
Open — 25 25 24 
Closed — 0 0 1 
Other SURR schools     
Open 50 25 25 23 
Closed 0 0 0 2 
                                                 
4 This includes nine schools spanning Kindergarten through Eighth Grade. 
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As Table 3 shows, half the elementary schools that were on the SURR list in 1998–99 
entered the Chancellor’s District in 1999–00. Our univariate analysis presents data for the 
Chancellor’s District elementary schools that remained open for the four school years from 1998–
99, the pre-implementation or baseline year, through 2001–02, and compares changes in 
performance and other variables in those schools to changes in other SURR schools.5 We present 
the citywide averages for elementary schools as an overall benchmark. 
Regression Models  
To assess the effect of the Chancellor’s District intervention on school performance in the 
context of other potential causal factors, we developed regression models that include controls for 
student characteristics (e.g., school-level English proficiency, poverty, attendance, student 
demographics), as well as school-level characteristics (e.g., school size, expenditures, certain teacher 
characteristics). Our dependent variables are school-level fourth-grade reading and math 
performance.6 Our basic analysis is outlined in the equation:  
Pst = a + ß1Sst + ß2CDst + ß3Tt + SCHs + est (1) 
where Pst is the reading or math performance of the school s in year t, Sst is a vector of student 
and school characteristics, including school size, and CDst is the Chancellor’s District dummy 
that takes a value of “1” for the Chancellor’s District schools for years 1999–00, 2000–01 and 
2001–02, and “0” for the baseline year 1998–99. The comparison SURR schools take “0” for all 
years. Tt is a vector of year dummies, and SCH is a school fixed effect, essentially a vector of 
school dummies measuring the effects of unobserved or unmeasured time-invariant school 
characteristics, such as school culture, leadership, and other school-based factors affecting the 
implementation of the various SURR and Chancellor’s District components. est is an error term 
with the usual properties. To correct for heteroskedasticity, we employ robust standard errors. 
In order to estimate and control for the effect of additional resources on schools, we 
estimate a fuller model: 
Pst = a + ß1Sst + ß2CDst + ß3Tt + ß4TCHst + ß5Rst +SCHs + est (2) 
where TCHst is a vector of human resources, including teacher characteristics and the number of 
teachers per 100 students, and Rst represents monetary resources (non-teacher per student 
                                                 
5 Schools that were closed during this time period were excluded from the univariate analysis because 
their inclusion draws the 1998-99 averages downward—making the Chancellor’s District appear artificially 
successful in the later years. Conversely, closed schools are included in the regression analysis, described 
below, because their exclusion, as demonstrated by performing the analysis with and without these schools, 
would bias the Chancellor’s District coefficients upward. 
6 Our models are based on ordinary least squares (OLS) analysis. A case could be made that, given 
the great variety in schools’ sizes, it would be more appropriate to employ weighted least squares (WLS) 
models and weight our estimates by school enrollment. However, we compared the findings that we report in 
this paper with those of a WLS regression analysis and found that, in spite of some differences in the size of 
some coefficients, the conclusions remained the same. Thus, and because our focus is the Chancellor’s 
District’s impact on schools’ – rather than estimating the student population’s performance, we rely on the 
OLS results for our assessment. 
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expenditures). We analyze model (2) in reference to model (1), anticipating a change in the 
coefficient ß2 once resources are introduced to the model.  
We included school fixed effects in the model to allow a difference-in-difference 
specification; that is, we take into account how schools differ from one another, and we estimate the 
impact of the Chancellor’s District over and above the general differences. This methodology offers 
a precise estimate of Chancellor’s District improvement, averaged across all four years, compared to 
improvement in other SURR schools, the closest comparison group. SURR schools were also the 
beneficiaries of additional intervention and support. While these interventions were not as intensive 
as the many interventions of the Chancellor’s District, SURR schools thus present a moving target 
against which we measure the Chancellor’s District performance. 
Measurable Impact 
The goal of the Chancellor’s District was to increase the instructional capacity and the 
academic outcomes of the failing schools the district had incorporated. To assess whether, and to 
what extent, the Chancellor’s District achieved its goal, we compare the Chancellor’s District 
elementary schools to the other SURR elementary schools—as well as to all New York City 
elementary schools—on school-level characteristics and fourth grade academic performance in the 
1998–99 baseline year. We examine changes in Chancellor’s District, other SURR and the average 
New York City elementary schools between the 1998–99 and 2001–02 school years, after the target 
schools had spent three years in the Chancellor’s District. Finally, we report the results of our 
regression analyses that compare the academic performance in the Chancellor’s District schools to 
the other SURR schools, while controlling for factors other than the Chancellor’s District 
interventions, across all years. 
 
Table 4 
Student Demographics in Sample and All NYC Schools, 1998–99 
 
Demographic characteristics 
Chancellor's District 
Schools (N=25) 
Other SURR 
Schools (N=25) 
All NYC schools 
(N=666) 
% White 0.8 0.9 17.1 
% Black 54.1 56.0 35.6 
% Hispanic 43.2 41.6 36.9 
% Asian/other 1.9 1.5 10.4 
% Limited English proficient 16.9 15.4 14.7 
% Recent immigrant 4.4 3.8 7.1 
% Free lunch eligible 91.6 93.0 74.7 
% Full time special education 8.0** 12.1 5.8 
% In this school entire year 90.6** 87.7 91.5 
% Days students attended 87.8 88.4 91.0 
% Referrals to special education 4.3 4.2 3.6 
% Part time special education 6.0 6.2 6.4 
Student enrollment 715.9 760.1 795.9 
* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01. 
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Chancellor’s District and other SURR schools and the citywide average, 1998–99. 
In the 1998–99 baseline year, Chancellor’s District elementary schools and all other SURR 
elementary schools differed considerably from the average New York City elementary school across 
a variety of student and school characteristics. As Table 4 shows, both the Chancellor’s District 
schools and other SURR schools were somewhat smaller, much less white, considerably poorer, and 
had more special education students, but fewer immigrant students, than the average New York City 
elementary school. The Chancellor’s District schools and other SURR schools were quite similar to 
each other, with the important exceptions of the percent of students in full time special education 
and the percent of students who remained in their school for the entire year. 
The other SURR schools had proportionally more students in full-time special education 
than the Chancellor’s District schools, and more than twice as many as the average New York City 
elementary school (12.1% vs. 5.8%). In addition, other SURR schools had a significantly lower 
proportion of students who remained in the school for the entire year than the Chancellor’s District 
schools; the latter’s percentage was much closer to the citywide average. Thus, Chancellor’s District 
schools had significantly fewer students who moved in or out of the school during the school year 
than the other SURR schools. 
In 1998–99, Chancellor’s District Schools and other SURR schools also differed 
considerably from the average New York City elementary school in teacher resources and school 
expenditures. (See Table 5.) The Chancellor’s District schools had the lowest level of teacher 
resources in the city—lower percentages of fully licensed and experienced teachers—and the least 
stable teaching force. Furthermore, Chancellor’s District schools spent less than other SURR 
schools, in terms of both teacher expenditures and total per student expenditures. As Table 5 
indicates, the student performance outcomes of all Chancellor’s District schools and other SURR 
schools were considerably below the citywide average in the 1998–99 baseline year. 
 
Table 5 
Mean teacher characteristics and school expenditures, 1998–99 
Characteristics 
CD  
(N=25) 
Other SURR 
(N=25) 
All schools 
 (N=666) 
% Licensed teachers 67.1* 72.6 81.5 
% Taught 2+ yrs in this school 42.6 48.6 59.8 
% Taught 5 or more years 49.1* 54.1 59.3 
% Teachers with masters degrees 69.0 71.1 77.1 
Teachers per 100 students 6.7 7.2 6.4 
Per student expenditures $7,792.80** $8,537.20 $7,554.00 
Per student spending on teachers $3,357.20** $3,777.30 $3,509.20 
Non-teacher spending per student $4,435.70 $4,759.90 $4,044.70 
* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01. 
Expenditures are per student, for general education and part time special education students. 
 
Table 6 indicates that student performance in the Chancellor’s District schools did not differ 
much from performance in the other SURR schools. Chancellor’s District schools had a slightly 
lower percentage of students meeting the standard on the fourth grade reading test than the other 
SURR schools, and a slightly higher average scale score on the fourth grade math tests. In both 
cases, the differences between the average scores were marginally significant. However, both reading 
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and math performance in the Chancellor’s District and other SURR schools were considerably 
below the average performance of all the city’s elementary schools.  
 
Table 6 
Mean fourth grade test scores, NYC, 1998–99 
Characteristic CD schools (N=25) 
Other SURR 
(N = 25) 
All NYC 
(N=666) 
Mean reading scale score 606.5 607.5 628.0 
% meeting reading std. 12.2* 15.2 33.3 
% far below reading std. 38.6 38.5 20.8 
Mean math scale score 614.2* 609.0 636.2 
% meeting math std. 27.6 23.6 50.7 
% far below math std. 34.0 37.7 18.5 
* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01. 
 
Thus, in the 1998–99 school year, Chancellor’s District and other SURR schools had much 
higher levels of student need, lower levels of teacher resources, and poorer student performance 
than the average elementary school in the New York City system. This pattern of high student need, 
poor teacher resources and poor student performance is what the Chancellor targeted for 
improvement through the takeover of failing schools and the imposition of the Model of 
Excellence.  
Changes in Chancellor’s District and other SURR schools, 1998–99 to 2001–02 
Student demographics in Chancellor’s District schools and other SURR schools remained 
fairly constant from the 1998–99 baseline year through the 2001–02 school years, with several 
important exceptions. (See Table 7.) During this period, the overall student population declined in 
both groups of schools, by 10% in Chancellor’s District schools and 7% in other SURR schools.  
The proportion of special education students declined as well. In 1998–99, the average 
percentage of students in full time special education in Chancellor’s District schools (8.1%) was 
higher than the citywide average (5.8%). By 2001–02, this percentage had decreased to 4.8%, very 
similar to the average New York City school (4.6%). Other SURR schools experienced an even 
greater decline in the percentage of their students in full time special education—from 12.4% to 
7.8%. However, even with that decline, the percentage of students in full time special education in 
the other SURR schools in 2002 was still much higher than the citywide average and the 
Chancellor’s District average. The difference between the percentage of full time special education 
students in Chancellor’s District and other SURR schools was highly significant in both 1998–99 
and 2001–02. 
The percentage of students referred for special education evaluation in Chancellor’s District 
schools also declined by 1.3 percentage points, from 4.3% to 3.0%, between 1998–99 and 2001–02. 
By comparison, the referral rate in other SURR schools increased by 1.8 percentage points, from 
4.0% to 5.8%. The difference between the changes in the two groups was highly significant.47 The 
citywide referral rate also increased, from 3.6% in 1998–99 to 4.1% in 2001–02. The proportion of 
students who were English language learners declined in both Chancellor’s District (4.9 percentage 
points) and other SURR schools (4.2 percentage points), compared to a citywide decline of almost 
three percentage points. 
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Table 7 
Change in mean student and school characteristics, 1998–99 to 2001–02 
 
Pre-
intervention Intervention Difference 
 1998–99 1999–00 2000–01 2001–02 1999–2002 
Characteristic CD SURR CD SURR CD SURR CD SURR CD SURR
% White 0.8 0.9 0.8 1.0 0.8 1.2 0.8* 1.3 0.0*** 0.4
% Black 55.1 55.9 54.5 56.3 54.6 56.0 54.3 55.6 -0.8 -0.3
% Hispanic 42.2 41.6 42.5 40.9 42.4 41.2 42.7 41.3 0.5 -0.3
% Asian/other 1.9 1.6 2.3 1.8 2.2 1.7 2.3 1.8 0.4 0.3
% Limited English 16.5 15.1 14.9 13.3 13.0 11.9 11.6 10.9 -4.9 -4.2
% Recent immigrant 4.4 3.8 4.1 3.3 3.7 3.3 4.0 3.6 -0.4 -0.1
% Free lunch eligible 91.6 92.8 89.3 91.8 87.2 90.0 87.2 90.0 -4.4 -2.8
% Full time Special Ed 8.1** 12.4 7.9* 11.5 6.7 9.4 4.8** 7.8 -3.3 -4.6
% In school for year 90.5** 87.3 91.7** 89.4 91.3*** 88.3 90.6*** 87.1 0.1 -0.2
% Attendance 87.9 88.3 88.5** 89.4 89.3* 90.0 90.2 90.4 2.3 2.1
% Special Ed. referrals 4.3 4.0 6.2 5.9 4.8 5.2 3.0*** 5.8 -1.3*** 1.8
% Part time special Ed 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.1 5.8 5.7 5.0 5.6 -1.1 -0.7
Mean enrollment 700.5 750.7 667.8 722.0 660.6 713.0 631.9 696.6 -68.7 -54.1
Differences between CD and other SURR schools: * p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01. 
 
The most dramatic changes in the Chancellor’s District and other SURR schools occurred in 
resource provision. Table 8 shows a considerable improvement in the teacher resources of the other 
SURR schools, and an even more remarkable increase in the resources in Chancellor’s District 
schools. The formerly under-resourced Chancellor’s District schools were the beneficiaries of large 
increases in the number, quality, and stability of their teaching staffs.  
The Chancellor’s District schools also benefited from major increases in funding; their per 
student spending increased by $5,713 from 1998–99 to 2001–02, compared to an increase of $2,667 
per student in other SURR schools during the same period. By contrast, the average New York City 
school saw a smaller $2,234 increase in per student expenditures. The additional costs associated 
with the Chancellor’s District’s elementary schools reflect the implementation cost of the Model of 
Excellence in the Chancellor’s District schools.  
Most of this increased expenditure was for teachers. The implementation of the Model of 
Excellence in Chancellor’s District elementary schools not only reduced class size, but also provided 
at least four on-site staff developers in each school. Moreover, Chancellor’s District school 
expenditures also involved the cost of absorbing the salaries of ineffective teachers, as well as the 
15% salary differential for the additional extended time hours that teachers worked. These efforts 
brought Chancellor’s District schools, which had been lowest in expenditures on teachers, well 
above all other schools. 
In the 1998–99 school year, there were 6.7 teachers for every 100 students in Chancellor’s 
District schools. This ratio increased by 1.9 teachers, to 8.6 teachers per 100 students in the 2001–02 
school year. By contrast, there were 7.1 teachers for every 100 students in other SURR schools in 
1998–99, but that ratio increased by only 0.6—to 7.7 teachers—in 2001–02. The increase in the 
number of teachers per 100 students in Chancellor’s District schools, probably a reflection of 
reduced class size and the increase in staff developers, was highly significant, compared to the 
increase in the number of teachers per 100 students in other SURR schools, as well as to the much 
smaller increase in the citywide average. 
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Table 8 
Change in mean teacher characteristics and school expenditures, 1998–99 to 2001–02 
 Pre-intervention Intervention Difference 
 1998–99 1999–00 2000–01 2001–02 1999–2002 
Characteristic CD SURR CD SURR CD SURR CD SURR CD SURR
% Licensed teachers 67.2* 73.0 71.5 69.2 91.1 86.8 93.4* 89.7 26.2** 16.7
% Taught 2+ years in this school 42.2* 50.9 43.0* 50.5 45.6** 53.0 54.8** 62.6 12.6 11.7
% Taught 5 or more years 49.0 54 49.0 47.5 45.2 44.1 42.8 44 -6.3 -10.0
% Teachers with masters degrees 68.6 70.9 70.6 67.7 69.2 68.0 70.7 70.6 2.0 -0.3
Teachers per 100 students 6.7 7.1 7.9 8.1 9.2 8.8 8.6** 7.7 1.9** 0.6
Per pupil spending on teachers ($) 3,346*** 3,751 4,713*** 4,165 5,995*** 4,962 6,431*** 4,970 3,085*** 1,219 
Per pupil spending ($) 7,808* 8,495 9,792 9,689 12,344*** 11,033 13,520*** 11,162 5,713*** 2,667 
Differences between CD and other SURR schools: * p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01. 
Expenditures are per student, for general education and PT special education students. Differences are calculated only for schools that existed in 
both 1998–99 and 2001–2002. 
 
In 1998–99, the percentage of licensed teachers in Chancellor’s District schools (67.2%) was significantly lower than in other SURR 
schools (73.0%). By 2001–02, the two groups’ relative positions reversed, and the percentage of licensed teachers in Chancellor’s District 
schools (93.4%) was significantly higher than in other SURR schools (89.7%). Chancellor’s District schools increased their licensed 
teachers by 26.2 percentage points in this three-year period, while other SURR schools increased their licensed teachers by 16.7 percentage 
points. The increase in the percentage of licensed teachers in Chancellor’s District schools was highly significant, compared to the increase 
in the percentage of licensed teachers in other SURR schools, as well to the citywide average. 
A third area of improvement was in the stability of the teaching staff. In 1998–99, only 42.2% of teachers in Chancellor’s District 
schools, compared to 50.9% in other SURR schools, had been in their school for two or more years. While this statistic rose by 12.6 
percentage points from 1998–99 to 2001–02 in Chancellor’s District schools, it rose by a similar amount (11.7 percentage points) in other 
SURR schools.  
Although both Chancellor’s District and other SURR elementary schools experienced improvements in their overall funding and 
expenditure on teacher resources throughout the period, improvements in the Chancellor’s District schools were greater than in the other 
SURR schools. By 2001–02, Chancellor’s District schools’ total spending and their spending on teachers were much greater than other 
SURR schools, and Chancellor’s District schools had a higher number of teachers per student and a higher percentage of fully licensed 
teachers. This situation contrasted sharply with what had prevailed four years earlier. 
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There were also considerable changes in academic performance in the Chancellor’s District 
and other SURR schools from 1998–99 to 2001–02. As Table 9 shows, within those four school 
years, most of New York City’s SURR schools improved sufficiently to be removed from the state’s 
SURR list, a considerable achievement. Fifty-six percent of Chancellor’s District schools and 60% of 
other SURR schools were removed from the SURR list, a similar pace of improvement for both 
groups of schools. 
 
Table 9 
Change in SURR status in New York City’s SURR schools, 1998–99 to 2001–02 
CD schools Other SURR schools  
Number Percent Number Percent 
Closed 1 4 2 8 
Removed from the SURR list 14 56 15 60 
Still on the SURR list 10 40 8 32 
Total 25 100 25 100 
Source: New York State Education Department 
 
Table 10 indicates that the percentage of fourth grade students in Chancellor’s District 
schools meeting the state’s reading standard increased significantly more than the percentage of 
fourth grade students in other SURR schools. In 1998–99, a lower percentage of students met the 
reading standard in Chancellor’s District schools (12.3%) than in other SURR schools (15.3%). But 
by 2001–02, the two groups’ relative positions reversed; more students met the reading standard in 
Chancellor’s District schools (30%) than in other SURR schools (27.2%). The 18 percentage point 
improvement in the scores of Chancellor’s District schools is particularly strong. The citywide 
average for elementary schools across those years increased 14 percentage points—from 33.4% of 
fourth grade students meeting the state’s reading standard in 1998–99 to 47.8% in 2001–02. (See 
Figure 5.) 
 
Table 10 
Change in mean fourth grade reading and math results, 1998–99 to 2001–02 
Pre-
intervention Intervention Difference 
1998–99 1999–00 2000–01 2001–02 1999–2002 Characteristic 
CD SURR CD SURR CD SURR CD SURR CD SURR
Mean reading scale score 606.8 607.4 613.2 614.5 619.6 615.5 627.8 626.7 21.0 19.3
% meeting reading std. 12.3 15.3 21.5 22.1 26.9** 22.6 30.0 27.2 17.7** 11.9
% far below reading std. 38.3 39.0 32.6 34.3 26.3** 32.1 21.7 21.8 -16.6 -17.2
Mean math scale score 614.3* 609.4 610.7 612.1 618.7 617.8 626.0 623.5 11.8 14.1
% meeting math std. 27.8 23.6 22.0 23.9 30.6 29.8 38.0 34.1 10.2 10.5
% far below math std. 33.8 37.3 35.0 32.9 28.3 30 16.8 19.7 -17.0 -17.7
Differences between CD and other SURR schools: * p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01. 
 
Between the 1998–99 and 2001–02 school years, there were no significant differences in the 
change in math scores in Chancellor’s District schools compared to other SURR schools. However, 
the pattern of change in math performance is more complex. While both groups improved over 
these years, Chancellor’s District performance, which was significantly higher than the performance 
of SURR schools in 1998–99, declined in 1999–00 and recovered over the next two years. Math 
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performance in other SURR schools, by contrast, had a continuously positive upward trajectory. The 
end result is that the math difference between the two groups remained essentially the same. 
The findings of our univariate analyses suggest that the Chancellor’s District schools 
improved their students’ reading skills more than the other SURR schools. They also show that, 
although both groups of schools experienced important improvements in the number and quality of 
their teaching staff and their expenditure levels, these changes were much more pronounced in 
Chancellor’s District schools than in other SURR schools. 
However, the univariate analysis does not provide insight into how much of this improvement 
can be attributed to the Chancellor’s District intervention as opposed to the possible effects of other 
factors, such as changes in the composition of the schools’ student populations. It is particularly 
important to control for student characteristics such as special education or limited English 
proficiency, because the proportions of students in these categories were sharply reduced across the 
years of the analysis. Similarly, given the dramatic improvement in funding, teacher to student ratios 
and teacher quality, it is important to determine how much of the change in student performance can 
be attributed to improved funding and teacher resources. 
To examine these issues while disentangling the effects of the different factors involved, the 
next section presents the regression analyses carried out to determine if the patterns in school-level 
performance remain after controlling for differences in student, school and teacher characteristics, 
as well as school expenditures. 
Regression Analysis 
Table 11 displays the estimated differences in academic performance, controlling for student, 
school, and teacher characteristics, as well as per-student expenditures, between Chancellor’s District 
schools and other SURR schools. A positive coefficient in the regressions estimating effects on the 
percent of students scoring at or above the state reading and math standards (Levels 3 and 4) 
indicates a positive association with student performance. Conversely, a positive coefficient in the 
regressions predicting the percent far below the state reading and math standards indicates a 
negative association with student performance. 
The coefficients suggest that, when we control for student and school characteristics, 
student performance on the fourth grade state reading test is significantly better in Chancellor’s 
District schools than in other SURR schools. This is reflected in the higher average percent of 
students scoring at or above the standard, and in the lower percent of students scoring far below the 
standard. 
The influence of the other variables varies across models, depending on whether the model 
controls for resources or not. Moreover, the coefficient on the year dummies is in many cases 
significant, and becomes larger in the more recent years, reflecting an overall pattern of increasing 
achievement in student performance across the entire sample of schools. 
The Chancellor’s District’s effect on student performance on the fourth grade math test is 
not as encouraging. As the regression table indicates, Chancellor’s District schools do not differ 
significantly from other SURR schools on the percent of students scoring at Levels 3 and 4, or at 
Level 1. The failure to significantly improve math scores in the Chancellor’s District may be a direct 
result of the much more intensive curricular and scheduling focus on improving reading skills. Or 
the reading skills, and scores, of the Chancellor’s District students may have improved at the 
expense of their math scores.  
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Table 11  
Effects on fourth grade academic performance, without (Model 1) and with (Model 2) resources 
% meeting  
reading standard 
% reading  
far below standard
% meeting  
math standard 
% far below 
math standard Characteristic 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Chancellor's 
District 
5.706*** 
(2.043) 
5.898** 
(2.140) 
-4.299* 
(2.308) 
-3.944* 
(2.334) 
-1.842 
(3.066) 
-2.314  
(3.159) 
1.615  
(2.736) 
2.273 
(2.948) 
Student & school  
% Black -1.826 
(1.517) 
-2.850* 
(1.607) 
-0.338 
(1.483) 
0.128 
(1.566) 
0.080 
(1.814) 
-1.133 
(1.718) 
-0.791 
(2.064) 
-0.024 
(2.224) 
% Hispanic -2.396 
(1.529) 
-3.325** 
(1.608) 
0.028 
(1.516) 
0.512 
(1.555) 
-0.820 
(1.885) 
-1.888 
(1.798) 
-0.456 
(2.089) 
0.148 
2.220) 
% Asian or 
other 
-1.150 
(1.711) 
-2.550 
(1.783) 
0.608 
(1.826) 
1.129 
(1.933) 
-0.004 
(2.260) 
-1.803 
(2.179) 
0.350 
(2.231) 
1.198 
(2.458) 
% Limited 
English  
0.214 
(0.260) 
0.307 
(0.285) 
-0.008 
(0.277) 
-0.135 
(0.307) 
-0.083 
(0.326) 
0.073 
(0.353) 
0.222 
(0.290) 
0.133 
(0.312) 
% Recent 
immigrant 
-1.228* 
(0.636) 
-1.259** 
(0.629) 
0.704 
(0.610) 
0.821 
(0.625) 
0.408 
(0.782) 
0.374 
(0.776) 
-0.091 
(0.799) 
0.040 
(0.772) 
% Free 
lunch eligible 
-0.043 
(0.095) 
-0.077 
(0.095) 
-0.132 
(0.100) 
-0.136 
(0.107) 
-0.302**
(0.141) 
-0.288* 
(0.151) 
0.114 
(0.137) 
0.087 
(0.140) 
% Full-time 
special ed. 
-0.092 
(0.210) 
-0.061 
(0.213) 
0.706***
(0.223) 
0.639***
(0.240) 
-0.453* 
(0.262) 
-0.428 
(0.282) 
0.539** 
(0.226) 
0.520** 
(0.234) 
% In school 
entire year 
-0.083 
(0.218) 
-0.073 
(0.228) 
0.039 
(0.227) 
0.075 
(0.238) 
0.007 
(0.306) 
0.055 
(0.306) 
0.2404 
(0.272) 
0.301 
(0.270) 
% 
Attendance 
-0.043 
(0.737) 
-0.232 
(0.715) 
0.166 
(0.771) 
0.511 
(0.795) 
0.116 
(1.001) 
-0.290 
(0.941) 
-0.083 
(0.967) 
0.364 
(0.907) 
% Special ed. 
referrals 
-0.146 
(0.265) 
-0.050 
(0.279) 
-0.624* 
(0.344) 
-0.708** 
(0.349) 
0.190 
(0.356) 
0.273 
(0.357) 
-0.235 
(0.314) 
-0.384 
(0.316) 
% Part-time 
special ed. 
-0.175 
(0.521) 
-0.435 
(0.553) 
-0.111 
(0.561) 
-0.124 
(0.588) 
0.044 
(0.612) 
-0.074 
(0.621) 
0.844 
(0.653) 
1.266* 
(0.652) 
Students -3.390 
(5.469) 
6.984 
(7.729) 
-4.818 
(6.797) 
-15.263 
(11.053) 
-12.721* 
(7.093) 
0.697 
(10.701) 
11.197* 
(5.867) 
-9.215 
(8.894) 
Year 
4.454** 4.200** -1.184  -1.067  -4.116* -4.927** -0.812 1.051 2000 
(-1.75)  (-1.906)  (-1.991)  (-2.061)  (-2.191) (-2.44) (-2.213) (-2.386) 
7.392*** 4.312 -6.203*** -2.488  2.114 -4.203 -4.281 2.847 2001 
(-2.056) (-2.932) (-2.207) (-2.899) (-2.721) (-3.382) (-2.598) (-3.029) 
11.248** 7.523** -13.03*** -8.825*** 6.973** 0.289 13.286*** -6.068 2002 
(-2.633)  (-3.414)  (-2.503)  (-3.221)  (-3.266) (-3.986) (-3.236) (-3.75) 
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% meeting  
reading standard 
% reading  
far below standard
% meeting  
math standard 
% far below 
math standard Characteristic 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Resources 
  0.052    -0.108   0.155  -0.102 % Licensed 
teachers  (-0.101)    (-0.111)   (-0.125)  (-0.12) 
0.106** -0.028  0.155** -0.055 % Taught 
2+ yrs in 
school 
  
  (-0.05)   
(-0.068)  
 
(-0.067) 
 
(-0.071) 
   0.083   -0.176  0.207 % Taught 
5+ years   
0.008 
(-0.115)    (-0.122)  (-0.144)  (-0.148) 
-0.199* 0.111   -0.119  0.176 % with 
masters 
degrees 
  
  (-0.109)   
(-0.136)   (-0.147)  (-0.136) 
  0.043   0.181   -1.05  -0.784 Teachers per 
100 students   (-0.617)    (-0.701)   (-0.721)  (-0.753) 
  1.226   -1.597*  0.721  -2.178***Non-teacher 
expenditures  (-0.77)  (-0.85)  (-0.953)  (-0.792) 
239.5 347.6** 46.1 -22.5 85.6 207.4 52.1 -42.9 Constant 
(-159.7) (-165.1) (-154.0) (-162.3) (-186. 8) (-176.5) (-213. 6) (-221.4) 
N 197 195  197 195  197 195 197 195 
R-squared 0.70 0.72 0.69 0.71  0.64 0.68 0.67 0.70 
F-stat 
(Resources)  
1.69 
(-0.129)  
1.02 
(-0.42)  
2.31** 
(-0.04)  
3.14** 
(-0.01) 
F-statistic for 
school fixed 
effects 
2.044** 
(-0.001) 
2.251*** 
(0.000) 
1.793**
(-0.005)  
1.818** 
(-0.004)  
2.043**
(-0.001) 
2.297*** 
(0.000) 
1.434* 
(-0.056) 
1.706** 
(-0.010) 
* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01. 
 
Equally important, Model 2 assesses the effect of resources on reading and math 
performance. Teacher stability has a positive effect on the percent of students meeting the standard, 
suggesting the importance of a well-supported teaching staff. Non-teacher expenditures have a 
negative effect on the percent far below the standard, suggesting the positive effect of general 
resources. These results are intuitive. However, the fact that the effects of the other resource 
variables are not consistent across models, and the resource variables are jointly significant only in 
the two math models presented (F=2.31 and 3.14, probably for different reasons) reflect a generally 
weak, counterintuitive relationship between resources and performance. This finding is consistent 
with the reverse causality problem in education production, in which resources tend to be negatively 
correlated with performance, due to the high correlation between categorical expenditures, such as 
title 1 funds, and student need—which in turn are negatively correlated with performance. 
In comparing Model 1—a basic model in which teacher characteristics and expenditures are 
excluded—with a more complete model controlling for teacher characteristics and expenditures, we 
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find that the results are essentially the same. In theory, in Model 1 the Chancellor’s District 
coefficient could be inflated by the district’s huge resource advantage versus other SURR schools. If 
that were the case, we would expect the coefficients for Chancellor’s District dummy—and other 
variables—to be radically different (i.e., smaller) in Model 2, when we control for resources and 
teacher characteristics. That Model 2 shows a substantively unchanged Chancellor’s District 
coefficient suggests that the Chancellor’s District effect was not simply a matter of increased 
funding and teacher characteristics. The positive effect of the Chancellor’s District may be tied to 
enhanced administrative support, more efficient use of instructional resources, and other factors. 
However, without detailed implementation data, it is impossible to disentangle which parts of the 
intervention were more causal. 
Overall, these regression results reiterate the univariate findings in school-level 
performance—on average, the Chancellor’s District schools performed significantly higher in 
reading performance during the years these schools were under the centralized improvement 
regimen described above, but did not show much progress in math. The positive regression 
coefficients in reading suggest a significant improvement for the Chancellor’s District schools, 
relative to where these schools would have been and relative to comparable schools. These results 
are consistent when resources are added to the models. 
Revisiting the twin goals of our analysis, we assess whether the Chancellor’s District 
intervention increased schools’ instructional capacity and academic outcomes. Across the 1998–99 
through 2001–02 school years, the Chancellor’s District schools sustained higher student stability 
rates, increased teacher resources, and substantially increased per student expenditures, compared to 
both other SURR schools and the citywide average. Moreover, holding student characteristics, 
teacher characteristics and expenditures constant, the Chancellor’s District schools increased their 
fourth grade reading performance by considerably more than the other SURR schools. This finding 
suggests that, at the elementary school level, the Chancellor’s District as an intervention succeeded 
in improving the reading outcomes, though not the math outcomes, of its schools and students. 
Conclusion 
The Chancellor’s District, as a unique initiative in centrally-driven school improvement, 
represents a signal intervention into New York City school governance and administration. When 
the Chancellor, in 1996, invoked a previously unexercised power to take failing elementary and 
middle schools from their sub-district jurisdictions, he did what no other New York City schools 
chief had ever attempted. He proceeded to create a special, non-geographic district that eventually 
encompassed 58 failing schools, and developed a series of organizational, curricular, instructional, 
and personnel interventions, mandated for all the district’s schools, to jump-start their improvement. 
Thus the Chancellor’s District effort represents an historic departure from three decades of central 
school system tolerance of local sub-district instructional failure. 
The Chancellor’s District initiative challenges several traditions of policy analysis about the 
relationship between district administration and school change. Its theory of change counters 
reigning theories about the stultifying weight of urban education bureaucracies, the inability of 
loosely coupled systems to sustain centrally-driven change, and the dichotomy between what 
bureaucratic systems impose and the autonomy successful schools require. Thus the Chancellor’s 
District effort may represent a return to more traditional notions of centralized management, or a 
harbinger of the newly emerging emphasis on the district as the necessary locus of school change. 
But where it departs from this debate is as a demonstration that a top down approach, if attached to 
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resources and a set of appropriate reforms rather than the mere fact of greater centralization, could 
yield positive results. 
How the Chancellor’s District initiative is ultimately assessed in the history of urban 
education reform depends primarily on the outcomes of the effort. Our findings suggest two 
categories of results. First, our univariate analysis demonstrates that the Chancellor’s District 
intervention significantly increased teacher resources and per-student expenditure across the 
district’s schools, and significantly increased the percentage of students meeting the standard on the 
fourth grade state reading tests, compared to the outcomes of other SURR schools.  
Second, our regression analyses demonstrate that when the Chancellor’s District schools are 
compared to the other SURR schools (the schools most similar to those in the Chancellor’s District) 
and when the analyses control for student and school characteristics, teacher resources and per-
student expenditures, the Chancellor’s District schools do significantly better than other SURR 
schools in reading, but not in math. But given that the major curricular, instructional and 
organizational interventions of the Chancellor’s District focused intensively on improving student 
literacy, these outcomes suggest that the Chancellor’s District had begun to achieve one of its 
primary student achievement goals. The eventual impact of these gains in math performance is yet 
to be determined. 
It is important to note that the district’s upward curve in reading outcomes still left the 
Chancellor’s District schools quite far below the citywide average, though the initiative was clearly 
narrowing the gap. It is also important that the Chancellor’s District initiative we evaluated 
represents only those three academic years of effort, from 1999–00 to 2001–02, in which the 
components of the Model of Excellence were implemented in the district’s schools. Had the 
initiative not been terminated in 2003, would the upward curve of reading achievement have 
continued to rise? Would the math achievement that began to accelerate in 1999–00 have continued 
upward? Our data do not allow us to speculate.  
Both the Chancellor’s District and other SURR schools seem to have benefited from 
increases in teacher resources as well as overall expenditures. The Chancellor’s District schools 
received significantly more resources than the other SURR schools, which in turn received 
significantly more than the city schools as a whole. But when we control for the effects of teacher 
resources and per student expenditures, the Chancellor’s District’s elementary schools still perform 
significantly better than the other SURR schools in reading. Thus, something was working to 
improve outcomes in the Chancellor’s District schools that is not explained by increases in teacher 
resources or school-level expenditures. 
We cannot define what that something is, other than to point to the set of components that 
comprised the Chancellor’s District intervention. Because our evaluation was retrospective, we 
cannot specify what components of the intervention helped to produce the reading gains our 
findings demonstrate. Future research, perhaps benefiting from more intensive implementation data, 
can make the connection between gains for particularly successful or unsuccessful schools and the 
specific levels of interventions imposed. But it is important to reiterate that the Chancellor’s District 
took over some of the city’s least well-resourced schools serving the city’s poorest and lowest 
performing students. By developing, mandating and implementing a comprehensive set of 
organizational, curricular, instructional and personnel changes, the Chancellor’s District significantly 
improved the reading outcomes of the students in those schools, in three years of focused effort. 
This is not a small accomplishment. Whether the additional resources expended, in both teacher 
resources and per student expenditures, were ultimately worth the extent of improved achievement 
the Chancellor’s District initiative generated, is a complex but essential question that our subsequent 
research will attempt to answer. 
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